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Abstract: The neoclassical growth model predicts convergence of productivity or per 
capita output levels across regions. If participation in the labor force is constant, con-
vergence of per capita income is implied. We investigate this hypothesis for the Iranian 
economy using data on demand deposits as a proxy for GDP. Furthermore, the analysis 
controls for the effects of rent seeking. Due to its impact on the allocation of resources, 
rent-seeking is likely an impediment to overall growth. The results support absolute β-
convergence across Iran's provinces and provide some evidence on the adverse effect of 
rent seeking on regional convergence. 
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  11. Introduction 
A hypothesis implicitly embedded in the neoclassical model of economic growth is pro-
ductivity convergence across regions. If participation in the labor force is constant con-
vergence of per capita income is implied. Therefore, there should be an inherent ten-
dency for poorer regions to catch up to richer ones. Due to its relevance for regional 
economic policy, convergence has been an active area of research for many years [see 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) as seminal 
contributions]. 
On the other hand, the effects of rent-seeking and corruption on economic growth have 
been under study since the early 1990s. Theoretical analysis implies that rent-seeking is 
likely harmful for the economic performance. The main reason for an adverse effect is 
the allocation of most talented people to rent-seeking activities rather than innovation 
and entrepreneurship. Rent seeking activities can also influence the process of regional 
convergence, if they are concentrated in particular regions of a country. 
In this paper economic convergence is examined on the base of regional data for 25 Ira-
nian provinces. In contrast to previous studies, β convergence can be established. More-
over, evidence on the adverse effect of rent-seeking on the process of regional conver-
gence is provided. 
The paper is organized in five sections. The next two sections review the literature on 
convergence (section 2) and on the relationship between economic growth and rent-
seeking (section 3). Section 4 is devoted to data issues and holds the empirical results. 
Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
  22.  Economic convergence across regions 
Convergence of productivity and per capita income is an important prediction of the 
neoclassical growth model [see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992)]. Although this 
approach has been heavily criticized by the endogenous growth theory, β-convergence 
is still a workhorse of empirical research. It is theoretically well founded and provides 
insights into the speed of adjustment. Because of diminishing marginal returns of the 
reproducible input factors, regions should converge to a steady state, where the evolu-
tion is solely driven by technological progress. Given that the steady state growth path 
is the same across regions, absolute β-convergence will hold. However, if regions differ 
in their steady state determinants like savings rate and population growth, they will con-
verge to individual paths, implying that β-convergence might only hold in a conditional 
sense (Mankiw, Romer, Weil, 1992). The more homogeneous the regions are, the more 
appropriate the absolute concept. Although convergence has been examined initially by 
cross sections of countries, the interest has shifted to regions within a country. The driv-
ers of the convergence process, like capital mobility and labor migration are more pro-
nounced, and culture or institutions are more similar within the country borders. Hence, 
convergence should be more visible at the regional level. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992, and 2003) and Sala-i-Martin (1996) have detected 
β-convergence for US states, European regions and Japanese prefectures. The estimated 
speeds of convergence are extremely slow, but surprisingly similar across different data 
sets: regions tend to converge at a speed of approximately 2 percent per year. According 
to Coulombe and Lee (1995) changes in the terms of trade, government transfers, and 
taxes have supported convergence between Canadian provinces. Cashin (1995) exam-
ined convergence for Australian states and concluded that convergence occurred espe-
  3cially in earlier periods. Note that convergence might not be interpreted in favor of the 
theoretical concept, as the evidence may be linked to structural forces, like the shift 
from agriculture to manufacturing [see Paci and Pigliaru (1997) and Caselli and Cole-
man (2001)]. 
Many studies are also available for EU countries. For example, Kosfeld, Eckey, and 
Dreger (2006) found absolute and conditional β-convergence for German regions and 
reported adjustment speeds in the range of 5 to 7 percent. Also, Persson (1997) detected 
a high speed of convergence for Swedish counties. However the evidence is not unique 
and seems to depend on the time span considered in the analysis. McGuiness and Shee-
han (1998) and Gripaios, Bishop and Keast (2000) reported an increase in regional dis-
persion in the UK. Similar results have been obtained for Italian and Greek regions [see 
Terassi (1999), Siriopoulos and Asteriou (1998), Petrakos and Saratsis (2000)]. Gezici 
and Hewings (2004) are unable to find convergence for Turkish provinces, but reported 
a high degree of spatial dependencies. 
While convergence is often confirmed for earlier periods, the process came to a halt in 
the 1980s [see also Lopez-Bazo, Vaya, Mora and Surinach (1999) and Cuadrado-Roura 
(2001) for EU regions]. However, Karras (2001), Maurseth(2001) and Dall'erba (2005) 
found results in line with β-convergence in later periods. After a temporary halt in the 
1980s, a re-emergence in convergence might have occurred. But there is little support 
for the claim that the introduction of the European Monetary Union is an important 
driver in this regard (Martin, 2001). 
Empirical evidence is available not only for industrial, but also for developing countries 
and NICs. Serra, Pazmino, Lindow, Ramirez and Sutton (2006) looked at some Latin 
American states and revealed evidence in favour of convergence within Argentina, Bra-
  4zil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The speed of convergence is often very low, but 
it doubles after controlling for different regional steady states. National disparities in per 
capita output increased temporarily after each country pursued measures of trade liber-
alization. 
Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996) and Fujita and Hu (2001) have detected convergence 
across Chinese coastal provinces, but an increase in disparities between the coast and 
the interior, probably due to the increase in globalization and the liberalization of mar-
kets [see also Lin and Song (2002)]. Also in India, a small group of states is pulling 
away, thereby causing a second peak in the income distribution (Trivedi, 2003). Hossain 
(2000) found β-convergence of per capita GDP for most regions in Bangladesh. Kim 
(2005) has analyzed Korean regions and reported a very high speed of convergence of 
about 8 percent per year. 
 
3.  The adverse impact of rent-seeking on economic growth 
The wide dispersion of per capita income across countries might be related to differ-
ences in social infrastructures [see Hall and Jones (1999)]. Social infrastructure refers to 
the overall environment of economic activities, including government policies [see also 
North (1990) and Baumol (1990)]. For developing countries, Sachs and Warner (1995), 
Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 
2002), and Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) have explored the role of geography in the 
adoption of appropriate institutions from Western world which foster economic growth 
and development. A favourable social infrastructure supports productive activities and 
encourages physical and human capital accumulation, invention, and technology trans-
  5fer. Private and social returns are kept close together, thereby providing incentives for 
productive activities. Properly defined institutions cause agents to be rewarded by the 
full amount of their production. Individuals do not need to invest resources in avoiding 
diversion. 
Rent-seeking and corruption can hamper the economic performance. This kind of be-
haviour covers all activities in which an individual obtains an amount not from produc-
tive activities, but from predation, bribery, suing someone in the court, using public fa-
cilities for private purposes and so on. The economic analysis of the consequences of 
rent-seeking started with the pioneering work of Tullock (1967, 1971) and Krueger 
(1974). Baumol (1990, 2004) has emphasized the allocation of entrepreneurship, which 
can be crucial factor to explain the different growth experience across countries. Al-
though levels of entrepreneurship may be similar, the economic performance can be 
very different as a result of different allocations of talents. The allocation of entrepre-
neurship to productive and rent-seeking activities depends on the reward structure in the 
economy. 
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991, 1993) presented a formal analysis of the allocation 
of talent and how people decide to be workers, producers, or rent-seekers. The most tal-
ented people are attracted either to productive or rent-seeking activities, depending on 
the market size, the compensation contract, and the returns to scale in those activities. If 
the most talented people decide to be rent-seekers as a result of the reward structure, the 
growth rate will be lower. In the model of Acemoglu (1995) the reward structure is de-
termined endogenously. Rent-seeking exhibits increasing returns to scale. This raises 
the existence of multiple equilibriums and underdevelopment traps. 
  6Grossman and Kim (1995), Grossman (1998) and Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2003) 
have demonstrated how economies may get stuck in clubs of predators with vicious cy-
cles of poverty and predation. Interest groups can deter the introduction of new tech-
nologies or the adoption of existing technologies [see Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)]. 
In effect, individuals or political groups who benefit under the existing political system 
can be a barrier for growth and development. Countries can also suffer from a weak in-
stitutional framework (Bjorvatn and Selvik, 2005). Competing bureaucrats impose in-
dependent and high levels of bribes on private businesses. Also, the necessity of secrecy 
can shift public investment from high value to useless alternatives if the latter have bet-
ter opportunities to veil corruption. Darby, Li and Muscatelli (2004) analyzed the effect 
of uncertainty on the outcome of political elections on the composition of public expen-
ditures. Inefficiencies can arise as government expenditures are switched from invest-
ment to consumption. 
From an empirical point of view, the lack of data on rent-seeking is a serious obstacle. 
Magee, Brock and Young (1989) found lower growth rates in countries with more law-
yers. Barro (1991) suggested high levels of government consumption and political 
coups as indications for rent-seeking. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) have pro-
posed the ratio of college enrolments in law and in engineering to total enrolments. The 
idea is that a higher ratio of college enrolments in engineering is a measure of allocation 
of talent to innovative and productive activities, while a higher ratio of college enrol-
ments in law is an implication of allocation of talent to rent-seeking. They reported 
positive and significant effects of engineering enrolments, while the effects of law en-
rolments are insignificant. Brumm (1999) looked on employment in public and legal 
services. By using the numbers of interest organizations registered to lobby in the legis-
  7lature process and interest organization densities, Cole and Chawdhry (2002) provided 
evidence for the negative effects of rent-seeking on economic growth, public investment 
and public services. 
Mauro (1998) reported a negative relationship between corruption and government ex-
penditure on education, which is critical for growth, but not an attractive area for rent-
seeking [see also Guetat (2006)]. According to Baland and Francois (2000) a resource 
boom increases rent-seeking and lowers GDP growth especially if the share of entrepre-
neurs in the economy is low. 
Under some circumstances rent-seeking might also contribute to economic growth. This 
is observed in some East Asian countries [see Kang (2002), Haggard (2004) and Rock 
and Bonnett (2004)]. The rationale for the existence of high levels of corruption and 
high growth is attributed to patron-client networks. State patrons are strong relatively to 
clients and corruption networks are organized and managed by a centralized state. 
Therefore, policies made protect new growth enhancing property rights. Li and Zhou 
(2005) provide some evidence on the relationship between political turnover and eco-
nomic performance in China. The promotion of provincial leaders with a better eco-
nomic record explains much of the success of the economic performance in China. 
 
4.  Rent seeking and regional convergence in Iran 
Iran is a developing country rich in natural resources, especially in oil and gas. A spe-
cial problem that has been discussed for countries with rich natural resources is the re-
source curse; that is, these countries often have experienced lower rates of economic 
growth (Auty, 1993). One explanation for the resource curse in Iran is massive rent-
  8seeking and corruption [see Alizadeh (2003), Renani and Khezri (2005) and Bjorvatn 
and Selvik (2005)]. 
Iran experienced high and sustained economic growth with low inflation in the 1960s, 
when oil incomes accounted only for a small share in Iran's GDP. After periods of rising 
oil prices in the 1970s, Iran experienced lower growth rates on average while it encoun-
tered double digit inflation rates. In the 1980s, growth rates lowered and became even 
negative while inflation remained high, mainly due to the war between Iran and Iraq. At 
the same time, Iran's economy became more regulated and state-owned with the natural 
result of spreading regulatory rents. In the early 1990s, a surge in government expendi-
tures to reconstruct the damages of the war and the semi-liberalization of the economy 
caused very high inflation and moderate growth rates. In the time period 1996-2005, 
Iran became gradually more stable with economic reforms and less expansionary poli-
cies. Thus, the economy experienced decreasing inflation and a mild sustained growth 
path accompanied by oil incomes that were not massively injected into the economy. 
Under the new government, this process came to a halt. 
Iran's economy has been under the influence of rent-seeking since the early 1970s. It 
does not mean that there was no rent-seeking before the 1970s. Rent-seeking was quite 
centralized among a limited group of elites, mainly linked to Shah's relatives. Thus, the 
situation was more or less similar to the successful East Asian countries. The surge in 
oil incomes in the 1970s caused rent-seeking to get out of control, while there was no 
change in Iran's political system or institutions. In fact, the massive increase in govern-
ment expenditures to pursue ambitious but inaccessible development goals provided the 
ground for high and destructive competition for rent-seeking. While almost all large 
businesses came under the control of the government after the revolution, rent-seeking 
  9continued. The driving force was the nationalization of almost all big firms and the ten-
dency for a more state-owned economy. Although our purpose is not to test for the ef-
fects of rent-seeking on economic growth here, but a look at the Log of non-oil GDP for 
the time period 1959-2005 shows a break in the growth path in 1975. This is consistent 
with the literature. In fact, the spread of rent-seeking after the sharp increase in oil in-
comes and thereby ambitious government expenditures 1970s caused a permanent de-
crease in the economic growth. What we are interested in here is to provide some pre-
liminary results on the effect of rent-seeking on regional convergence. So, we consider 
as given the adverse effect of rent-seeking on economic growth. 
Most rent-seeking activities are organized by establishing some kinds of businesses. 
Examples can include import licenses, subsidized loans, contracts to provide goods and 
services for government sector or implementing development projects, to obtain owner-
ship of lands for urban or other uses etc. The concentration of rent-seeking activities in 
Tehran is important. Even many businesses located in other regions are organized from 
Tehran. Although government activities could have positive effects on the level of in-
comes in all regions, a substantial amount of rents are created in or transferred to Te-
hran. This is the main reason for the attractiveness of Tehran for the most talented and 
highly educated people. The dominance of Tehran could undermine the growth per-
formance in the overall country, but also regional convergence between the provinces. 
Therefore, the empirical analysis is based on a test of regional convergence and the im-
pact of Tehran in this process. Although there may be explanations for regional dispar-
ity on the basis of the presence of ethnic groups in poor regions, the main problem is 
rent-seeking and its concentration in Tehran. In fact, some provinces without ethnic 
groups and close to Tehran are not more developed than provinces with ethnic groups. 
  10Convergence regressions are carried out by measures for per capita output. However, 
regional GDP is available only for 5 years. The data are not very reliable and subject to 
revision. Hence private sector demand deposits are used as a proxy for GDP instead [see 
also Rahmani and Eckey (2004)]. They are drawn from banking system balance sheets 
and have a high degree of precision. As public sector deposits are excluded, they have 
also a high correlation with real private economic activities and incomes. In fact, GDP 
includes oil income that is a public business without strong correlation to regional eco-
nomic activities. Demand deposits are even better suited than industrial GVA as large 
manufacturing firms are under state control. 
Policy and infrastructural variables are included in the regressions to examine the ef-
fects of certain policies on economic growth. These measures refer to government in-
vestment and consumption, road length, and the number of telephones including mo-
biles. The series are expressed in real per capita terms, where the consumer price index 
is used as a deflator (1997=100). 
Data are gathered from different issues of Statistical Yearbook of the Center of Iran Sta-
tistics and inside reports of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The analy-
sis is based on annual data covering the 1996-2005. Currently, Iran has 30 provinces, 
while there were only 25 in 1996. Therefore, we have used the provinces as they were in 
1996 to have a consistent dataset. The regional dimension allows an assessment of con-
vergence at the national level. However, dependencies between the regions have to be 
taken into account. They may stem from common or idiosyncratic shocks, which can 
generate spillovers between the cross sections. Eventually, variables are spatially auto-
correlated over the regions, and this can bias the regression results (Anselin, 1988). 
  11To get an impression on the extent of spatial autocorrelation the Moran test is applied to 
all variables in the analysis. Moran’s I is a global measure of spatial autocorrelation for 
each variable [see table 1]. The statistic is significant only for the growth rate of demand 
deposits and the average level of government investment. But even in these cases, the 
degree of spatial autocorrelation is rather modest. Due to this evidence, a parsimonious 
model is estimated without spatial effects. This decision does not affect any of the con-
clusions, since the residuals from the convergence regressions show no signs of spatial 
dependencies (table 2). 
-Table 1 about here- 
For convergence the mean growth rate of per capita demand deposits is regressed on the 
initial level of per capita demand deposits. In contrast to Rahmani and Eckey (2004), β-
convergence can be detected with a speed 3.75% per annum [see table 2]. This figure 
should be interpreted as an upper limit for the true convergence process. In particular 
the increasing use of demand deposits in transactions in underdeveloped regions as a 
result of development of banking in recent years might have raised the β coefficient. At 
the same time, the decline in the growth rates of population in poor regions have been 
more in recent decade that could have increased the growth rates of per capita demand 
deposits in those regions temporarily.  In the next step, the model is extended by the in-
clusion of mean growth rates of government investment and consumption expenditures 
(table 2). Measures of the infrastructure like road length or the number of telephones are 
largely insignificant. 
  12Government investment expenditures have positive significant effects on real economic 
activities. This could mean that government development expenditures are effective in 
fostering convergence, while government consumption exert insignificant effects. How-
ever, the speed of convergence is lower when these additional regressors are embedded. 
This could imply some ineffectiveness of government activities, probably because of 
rent-seeking. 
-Table 2 about here- 
In fact, the special kind of rent-seeking in Iran is a weakening factor against regional 
convergence. Since rent-seekers are mainly located in Tehran and other rich provinces, 
distribution of rents can cause these rich provinces to grow more. This may account for 
the lack of convergence in earlier periods. The study of Rahmani and Eckey (2004) fo-
cused on the early 1990s, which are characterized by the reconstruction after the war 
with Iraq. The sharp increase in government expenditures in the early 1990s provided an 
opportunity to obtain large amounts of rents and as mentioned there is a strong force to 
offset regional convergence in such periods. In contrast, the period 1996-2005 is more 
stable. Initially lower oil prices squeezed oil incomes, implying that the government 
could not continue the pace of rising expenditures. Although the oil price rose in the 
second half of the time period under study, the government did not fully inject the oil 
incomes into the economy. As a consequence, there was less opportunity for rent-
seeking. 
  13There is a high tendency for rent-seekers to concentrate in Tehran to be able to lobby for 
rents. To explore this hypothesis Tehran is excluded from the panel [see table 3 for the 
regression results]. 
-Table 3 about here- 
Overall, the evidence is quite similar to those obtained in the entire sample. Again, β-
convergence can be established. Nevertheless, there are some striking differences. The 
speed of convergence is higher when Tehran is excluded. Moreover, the inclusion of 
government investment and consumption expenditures increases the speed of conver-
gence. The speeds of convergence are more than 1 percent higher when conditional β-
convergence is examined for the sample without Tehran.  Therefore, Tehran can be seen 
as a province that weakens regional convergence. If rent-seekers are mainly located in 
rich provinces and especially in Tehran, income growth is higher and offsets the path of 
convergence to some extent. To be sure that the results of the exclusion of Tehran are 
implying the effect of rent-seeking and not just a statistical phenomenon, we ran the re-
gressions with the exclusion of Khozestan province (but not Tehran) from which most 
of Iran’s oil income is obtained. The results were the same as those in table 2. Since oil 
production does not have strong link to other economic activities and there is no signifi-
cant rent-seeking in this province, there is no significant change in the regressions when 
this province is excluded. This is in line with our analysis. It is widespread rent-seeking 
in Tehran that weakens regional convergence. 
Another piece of evidence that deserves attention is that the mean growth rates and the 
levels of banks loans are not significant in any regression. From a theoretical point of 
  14view, there should be a strong relationship between loans and demand deposits. Hence, 
the insignificance of loans in the regressions can imply that there is a high degree of 
rent-seeking in those loans. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has analysed regional economic convergence using a sample of Iranian prov-
inces. The analysis is based on demand deposits as a proxy for regional GDP. In addi-
tion, the impacts of rent seeking on convergence are explored. Due to the lack of high 
quality data only some indirect insights are provided. The results indicate that the prov-
inces converge. At the same time, the presence of rent-seeking activities seems to weak-
en the convergence process. The impact of rent-seeking turns out to be higher if there is 
an increase in government expenditures which provides the opportunity for more rent-
seeking. An extension of this paper could be deeper analysis of rent-seeking by finding 
some indicators of this behaviour. 
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  22Table 1: Moran’s I of variables for the analysis 
   Moran  coefficient  z-value 
Demand deposits  Growth rate  0.147  1.58 
 Initial  level  0.205    2.06* 
Government investment  Growth rate  0.031  0.60 
  Average level  0.249   2.43* 
Government consumption  Growth rate  -0.221  -1.50 
 Average  level  -0.031  -0.09 
Note: 25 Iranian provinces, 1996-2005. Variables in real per capita terms. * shows significance at least at 
the 0.05 level. 
 
  23Table 2: Convergence regressions 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant 0.030*  0.003  -0.016 
Initial level  0.038*   0.030*    0.029* 
Gov. investment     0.289*    0.236* 
Gov. consumption      0.995 
Moran’s I (error)  0.099  0.065  0.068 
R2 Adj  0.342  0.657  0.670 
Note: 25 Iranian provinces, 1996-2005. Nonlinear least squares. Variables in real per capita terms. De-
pendent variable is the mean growth rate of demand deposits. Initial level is the initial level of demand 
deposits. Government investment and consumption refer to the average level. * shows significance at 
least at the 0.05 level. 
 
  24Table 3: Convergence regressions excluding Tehran 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant 0.028  -0.014  -0.042* 
Initial level    0.040*     0.042*    0.044* 
Gov. investment     0.319*    0.256* 
Gov. consumption      0.124 
Moran’s I (error)  0.107  -0.025  -0.093 
R2 Adj  0.237  0.653  0.692 
Note: 25 Iranian provinces, 1996-2005. Nonlinear least squares. Variables in real per capita terms. De-
pendent variable is the mean growth rate of demand deposits. Initial level is the initial level of demand 
deposits. Government investment and consumption refer to the average level. * shows significance at 
least at the 0.05 level. 
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